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Normative Surrender
Jerome B. Elkind*
INTRODUCTION
In the published papers of a recent colloquium on the life and works of Hugo
Grotius, the observation was made that Grotius attempted to steer a path between
"Utopian idealism which had no chance of exercising any influence on the actual
behavior of States, and Machiavellian realism which would have amounted to
total surrender to their will and whim."'
Concern for the distinction between idealism and realism, an issue even at the
dawn of the era of power politics, is very much a current issue. In the world of
modem international law doctrine there is no greater scorn than that reserved by
self-professed "realists" for those whom they choose to regard as "idealists." In
the cynical atmosphere of the late twentieth century, it is fashionable to be a
realist. Few willingly claim the title of idealist. Among the sins ascribed to
idealists are naivete, blinkered optimism, and failure to understand the realities
of international life. But the charge which carries a real sting is that of "nor-
mative sloppiness," a failure to distinguish between lex lata and lexferenda.2
It is a fallacy to assume that any given international lawyer can be neatly
categorized as a realist or an idealist. Most approach the subject with a mixture of
realism and idealism. To be charged with some of the sins ascribed to idealists
can amount almost to a charge of professional incompetence. Yet few would
approach international law without some concern for human justice, without
some desire to use the discipline to attempt to avoid nuclear cataclysm and
without some sense of futility at the prospect of securing peace and justice
simultaneously.
It is submitted, at the risk of being accused of idealism, that those who most
*Visiting Professor, University of Wyoming, College of Law. This article was completed while the
1 was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor John
Hazard for very kindly sharing his office space with me during that period and for his considerable
support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professors Oscar Schachter, Walter Gelhome,
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Gardner, William Young, Lori Damrosch, and Michael A. Schwind of
New York University Law School for their helpful advice and criticism.
I. Abi-Saab, Grotius as a System Builder: The Example of Jus Ad Bellum, GRorIUS ET L'ORDRE
JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL 81 (Dufour ed. 1985).
2. This charge is related to the charge of wishful thinking. The normative assumption that idealists
are frequently accused of is the assumption that because something ought to be the law it is the law.
264 GENERAL ARTICLES
conspicuously don the mantle of realism are also guilty of normative sloppiness, a
form of sloppiness which deserves the name "normative surrender" because it
concedes large areas of the law to the will and whim of States. This article will
examine the phenomenon of normative surrender and provide some examples of it.
I. THE "GROTIANS" AND THE "INDUCTIVISTS"
The question of normative integrity surfaced rather sharply just over twenty
years ago in a debate between C. Wilfred Jenks, a proponent of the "Grotian"
school of international law, and Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, the founder of
the "inductive" school of international law. The modem Grotian approach to
international law was announced by Professor Hersch (later Sir Hersch) Lauter-
pacht when he took over the editorship of Oppenheim's great treatise on Interna-
tional Law. The fifth edition of that treatise, the first under Lauterpacht's
editorship, discussed, for the first time, Article 38(3) of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice3 which referred to "The general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations." Commenting on that provision, the fifth
edition says:
The formal incorporation of that practice in the Statute of the Court marks the
explicit abandonment of the positivist view according to which treaties and custom
are the only sources of International Law, with the result that in their absence
international tribunals are powerless to render decisions. It equally signifies the
rejection of the naturalist attitude according to which the law of nature is the
primary source of the Law of Nations. It amounts to acceptance of what has been
called the Grotian view which, while giving due-and on the whole, decisive-
weight to the will of States as the authors of International Law, does not divorce it
from the legal experience and practice of mankind generally.4
Lauterpacht named his school of international law after Hugo Grotius. Its
unique feature was that it professed to combine natural law with positive law. He
linked the Grotian position with seventeenth and eighteenth century writers
whom he described as standing midway between naturalists and positivists. They
considered the positive or voluntary law of equal importance to natural law and
devoted their interest to both alike. 5
The inductive approach was described as:
an empirically and dialectically evolved response to:(1) the shortcomings of deductive speculation and rationally unverifiable eclec-
ticism in the Doctrine of international law;
(2) oversimplifications such as the antinomies posed between naturalist and
positivist approaches to law in general, and international law in particular,
between the analytical and sociological treatment of international law, and
between "idealism" and "realism" in international law;
3. L.FL.OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (5th ed. Lauterpacht ed. 1937).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 91.
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(3) doctrinal attempts to blur, rather than clarify, the boundaries between lex lata
and lexferenda.6
In essence, the inductive school holds that a rule of international law can only
be authenticated as a rule de lege lata if it can be inductively verified by reference
to one of the three sources of international law set out in Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.' The inductive school is analytical
and it is positivist to the extent that its "basic proposition rests on actual consent
of the overwhelming body of the subjects of international law."' But it parts
company with positivism in rejecting the "voluntarist" first principle which
holds that international law consists solely of rules emanating from the will of
States. Thus, it accepts natural law notions "or any other ethical postulates-as,
for instance, considerations of humanity-if authenticated by one of the three
generally recognised law-creating processes of international law" .9 Schwarzen-
berger's book, Power Politics,10 is an unsentimental description of the environ-
ment in which international legal norms operate. As such, it provides a very clear
description of the functional limitations of the discipline of international law.
The main charges levelled by the inductive school against the Grotian school
were "deductivism" and "eclecticism" in that the Grotians were said to "pick
and choose from natural and positive law exactly as they think fit.""
The response was delivered by Jenks in his well known book, The Prospects of
International Adjudication.12 Chapter 11 purported to contain a refutation of the
inductive approach. In Jenks' view, the conclusions of the inductive school
"reflect the view that the present and potential effectiveness of international law
are narrowly circumscribed by the contingencies of power politics."'1 3 Thus,
"their implications for a major breakthrough towards the rule of law in world
affairs are distinctly discouraging.' 14
Much of Jenks' attack was concerned with logical methodology. But he also
suggested that the inductive school was "irresponsible" 5 because of the negative
effect that he thought it would have on the development of international law.
In response, Schwarzenberger asserted that international relations is a related
but quite distinct discipline. Therefore, the inductive approach to the study of
6. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1965) [here-
inafter THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH].
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 13.
10. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS (3d ed. 1964).
11. Id. at 13.
12. J. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION, 617-62 (1964) [hereinafter
PROSPECTS].
13. Id. at 617.
14. Id.
15. PROSPECTS, supra note 12, at 643.
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international law on the normative plane is independent of the views one may
hold on matters of international relations. 16 As to the charge of irresponsibility, he
considered that whether the implications of an analysis are discouraging is beside
the point if the analysis is correct. Jenks, he said, had not discharged the burden
of demonstrating that the analysis was incorrect. A breakthrough towards the rule
of law in world affairs, he felt, cannot be the responsibility of theorists. It
depends on whether those concerned (i.e. States) "are prepared to pay the price
required in terms of transfer (not merely limitation) of national sovereignty to
international and supranational institutions."' 7
The inductive approach is conservative and positivist. It must always remain
the law of the past. As Schwarzenberger himself admitted, "any inductive 'proof'
of a rule of international law always remains provisional: it is liable to be dis-
proved at any moment by better evidence that, in making any particular assess-
ment, was not available or was overlooked."' 8 One may even detect, in
Schwarzenberger's work a sort of wistful sympathy with World Federalism al-
though in his view "such a possibility may be dismissed as Utopian."' 19
A rich diet of optimistic eclecticism can lead to disillusionment when one
measures the expectations it creates against the real world of State sovereignty,
State interest, national security, and power politics. By comparison, the "real-
ism" of the inductive school seems remarkably clear-headed. But it is open to at
least one objection. While it must be granted that the willingness of States to
abide by and strengthen the rule of law is of paramount importance to its effec-
tiveness, this author parts company with Schwarzenberger's suggestion that the
doctrine of international law is irrelevant to the attitude of States. As we shall see,
the doctrine is vital.
II. RECENT COMMENTARY
In recent years, the fiercest advocate of a "realistic jurisprudence of interna-
tional law" has been J.S. Watson of Mercer University Law School.20 With
considerable gusto, Professor Watson has cut a critical swathe through the ranks
of academic international lawyers delivering and receiving many wounds.2'
16. THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH, supra note 6, at 116.
17. Id. at 117.
18. Id. at 5.
19. See SCHWARZENBERGER, FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 312-13 (1962).
20. Watson, A Realistic Jurisprudence of International Law, 34 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 265 (1980)
[hereinafter Realistic Jurisprudence]. See also Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the
World Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269 (1977-78) [hereinafter Demanding Human Rights];
Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order? 12 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239
(1979-80) [hereinafter Mass Killing]. It is Watson's criticisms that go right to the heart of legal
doctrine.
21. Perhaps the most pointed response to Watson's theories is to be found in a correspondence in
the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW by Jordan Paust, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 749-50
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The epigraph preceeding his essay on a realistic jurisprudence of international
law reveals his Austinian22 bias:
"What you cannot enforce, do not command"-Sophocles, Oedipus at Collonus. 23
The foundation of Watson's jurisprudence is relatively clear. International law
has no central enforcement authority. It has no court with compulsory jurisdic-
tion, no legislature, and no centralized police force:
There are, however, few theorists in international law who fully appreciate the
extent of the problem so created. Rather than seek to discover the technique
whereby the system operates, the tendency is clearly towards the suppression of this
knowledge, while creating or advocating rules that require, for their successful
implementation, the same degree of competence enjoyed by a domestic legislature
or appellate judiciary. 24
His primary accusation against many international lawyers, some of them the
most prominent in our generation, is wishful thinking in the sense that they wish
to assume a coercive and prescriptive force in international law which simply
does not exist:
No matter how inept a government might be, such power is always latent within the
system [of municipal law]. This power cannot be created by wishful thinking, or
projected into reality by a comparison of symptoms of its absence. It is either there
or it is not, and it is on this fact that all efficacious, prescriptive legal systems are
built.25
Watson is quite scathing about a number of explicit and implicit academic
assumptions. Among them are the assumption that United Nations organs have
the power to interpret the domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations
Charter (Article 2 (7)),26 the assumption that academic advocacy alone may
create world order,27 and the assumption that international law is superior to
municipal law.28 He also derides attempts to elaborate an international law of
human rights:
(1977). See also Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms 9
HOFSTRA L. REv. 347 (1980-81) [hereinafter Reply]; Schechter, The Views of 'Charterists' and
'Skeptics' On Human Rights in the World Legal Order, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 357 (1980-81) [here-
inafter Charterists and Skeptics]; D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COL. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
22. "Austinian" refers to the jurisprudence of the 19th Century English jurist John Austin. Austin
held that law is the command of the sovereign. Since there is no sovereign over nations, Austin
concluded that international law was not law properly speaking but positive international morality.
Today, theories that tie law to enforceability rather than normativity are said to be "Austinian."
23. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 265.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 273.
26. Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977) [hereinafter Autointerpretation].
27. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 270.
28. Id. at 267-68.
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Amnesty International has concluded that torture has been officially sanctioned in
sixty countries in the last decade and that forty states continued to practice it in
1975. These figures indicate a considerable discrepancy between the real rules and
the paper rules of international law.29
Watson's realism can be seen in the folowing passage:
International law has always built into its rules and concepts a posteriori mecha-
nisms which ensure reasonably close relationship between law and reality. . . . The
rules of international law . . . acknowledge that when there is a prolonged tension
between international law and international political reality it is the former that must
yield to the latter.30
In Watson's view, norms that are not observed by States are not norms of
international law. He takes the voluntarist position3' that international law con-
sists solely of the will of States as evidenced by State practice:
In the context of international theory in the human rights realm, the "inconve-
nient facts" are the political arrests, the torturing and the killing of hundreds of
thousands of people in dozens of countries. The inconvenient facts are state
practice.32
If one carries the voluntarist view to its logical extreme, there can never be a
violation of international law since the very fact of violation would refute the
existence of the norm. Watson does not go that far. What he does say is that
international law is only effective when it can be enforced by reciprocal expecta-
tion, 33 i.e. State A observes a rule vis-A-vis State B in the expectation that State B
will treat it in a similar manner. The sanction, and in Watson's view, perhaps the
only sanction, is a withdrawal of reciprocity. If State B violates a rule it can
expect a counter-violation by State A.
It will become clear that not only are the norms for the protection of human
rights inefficacious because of the lack of reciprocity in the horizontal order, but
also that the rules proposed are invalid under the prevailing techniques of norm
creation in international law.34
III. NORMATIVE SURRENDER-EXAMPLES
Example 1-Human Rights
With the above statement, Watson surrenders the whole body of human rights
law. He makes it quite clear that it is indeed a normative surrender:
29. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in
International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 611 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Theory]. See also Watson,
Normativity and Reality in International Human Rights Law, 13 STETSON L. REv. 221 (1983-84)
[hereinafter Normativity and Reality].
30. Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 626.
31. See text at notes 8-10, supra.
32. Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 641.
33. Id. at 619.
34. Id. at 626.
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Consent is a crucial element in the overall functioning of effective international
law, and any theory that disregards it is certain to experience severe problems in
compliance, when looked at from the normative viewpoint, and in accuracy, when
looked at from the descriptive viewpoint. 35
Watson is not entirely consistent. Perhaps subconsciously, he contradicts his
main point:
The current extent of human rights violations throughout the world cannot es-
cape the attention of even the most insulated of academics. 36
To speak of violations assumes that there is something to violate. Rights cannot
exist without a legal order that creates them and if they do not exist, they cannot
be violated.
Watson hardly mentions human rights treaties in his analysis. At one point he
characterizes treaties as a source of obligation rather than as a source of law. 37
Human rights do, in fact, present a unique problem in international law. Since
they involve a State's treatment of its own citizens, there can be no reciprocal
enforcement mechanism even in the case of human rights obligations voluntarily
undertaken by States through treaties." According to Watson, the lack of a
significant reciprocal interest in human right substantially reduces the efficacy of
treaties as a means of implementation:
This constitutes a very real limitation on the scope of the international legal sys-
tem's jurisdiction. For, if the subject matter of a norm does not affect another state
to a sufficient extent to make it willing, or likely, to respond to the violation, then
there is no motivation for compliance beyond pure self-limitation on the part of the
violator or potential violator. Such self-limitation needs no legal system at all. 9
Thus, according to Watson even norms which are observed are not law if obser-
vance stems from self-limitation rather than external enforcement. States do
undertake human rights obligations and they do comply with them. Perhaps the
most significant evidence of this is the willingness of many states to accept the
right of individual petition to some authoritative law-determining agency such as
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Commission on
Human Rights or the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. But Watson
does not mention these.'n
Watson also runs into trouble where international human rights norms are
hierarchically enforced. In reply to Watson, Professor Richard Lillich produced
substantial evidence of the application of norms of international law by United
35. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 274.
36. Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 611.
37. Id. at 618.
38. Id. at 619.
39. Id. See also Perspectives on Enforcement of Human Rights, 1980 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 1,4
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
40. Mass Killings, supra note 20, at 265-8.
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States Courts. 41 The U.S. Courts have applied general international law since the
United States Supreme Court ruled that such law is part of U.S. law and must be
ascertained and ,applied by U.S. courts 42
Lillich found "well over 50 cases since 1952 where international human rights
law has been invoked directly or indirectly by U.S. Courts. ' 43 He remarked:
To the extent my remarks have a thesis, it is that not only is there plenty of
international human rights law extant, but that courts increasingly are being briefed
on such law and taking it into account in reaching their decisions. 4
Watson's response to Lillich was succinct: "You cannot create customary interna-
tional law in one nation's courts. ", 4 While this may be true, it misses the point.
Lillich was not concerned with the creation of customary international law. The
point he was making was that U.S. courts, far from doubting the existence of
international human rights law, recognize it and employ it.
The doctrine that customary international law is part of internal law is not
unique to U.S. courts. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany says:
The General Rules of International Law shall form part of Federal Law. They shall
take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the
inhabitants of the Federal Territory.
In English jurisprudence, it has been held that:
whatever has received the common consent of civilised nations must have received
the assent of our country, and that to which we have assented along with other
nations in general may properly be called international law, and as such will be
acknowledged and applied by our municipal tribunals when legitimate occasion
arises for those tribunals to decide questions to which doctrines of international law
may be relevant. 46
Many other States regard general international law as part of their law.47 Here,
Watson's theory of international human rights law, if it were taken seriously,
41. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law,
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 20. See also Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in
Domestic Courts, 54 U. CINN. L. REv. 367 (1985).
42. See Justice Gray's frequently quoted holding in the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900).
43. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 21.
44. Id. at 20. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 . 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
FSupp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 654 F 2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
45. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 26.
46. West Rand Gold Mining Company v. The King [19051 2 K.B. 391, 406-7 (per Lord Alverston
C.J.). See also Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356 (per Lord Denning M.R.).
47. The term "general international law" has been a source of confusion. It is used here to refer
collectively to those norms described in Article 38(1)(b) and (c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, customary international law and "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."
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would prove genuinely detrimental to the development of that body of law.
Furthermore the theory involves an inadequate understanding of the place of
international law in municipal law.
Watson stresses the element of consent in international law. Yet he does not
entirely appreciate the nuances of consent as part of the law-creating process. A
norm of international law is a legal norm because it is conceived of as binding by
States or because States have undertaken to comply with it. This Watson recog-
nizes as the opinio juris element of customary international law.48 But a State
may accept a norm in principle even though it subsequently refuses to comply
with that norm. The response of a State charged with a violation of a well-
recognized legal norm is seldom to deny its existence as a legal norm. 49
No State in the modern world, whatever its actual practice, would argue the
legality of torture, genocide, or even the detention of political prisoners. A more
likely response is for the State to deny the accusation and to put the accuser to the
proof. The problem is not the lack of existence of law but the infrequency with
which a court or forum is available for the submission and trial of such proof.
Another response for a state accused of human rights violations is to hire an
advocate to justify its behavior in terms of the law. This is the same strategy
employed by a person charged with law violation in a municipal legal system.
Here too, the main problem is that an international tribunal is rarely available to
try conflicting claims of law.
The second element of customary international law is state practice. Watson's
main quarrel with international human tights law is based on his perception of
state practice. In his view, stories about massive and widespread violations of
human rights refute the claim that an international customary human rights law is
developing. Watson argues:
With increasing frequency one reads of governments killing, torturing, and im-
prisoning their citizens, almost on a routine basis. Yet at the same time one may
read learned articles in the legal literature which, with practiced ease, assure us that
such abuses of governmental power are subject to an international regime of human
rights. This discrepancy poses serious questions concerning both the validity and
the efficacy of the alleged rules, questions which should be of concern to any
theorist who sees the role of international law as something more than disembodied
ethical statements or wishful thinking.50
In reply, Louis Sohn says:
In his next debunking argument, Professor Watson points out that there is a very
wide discrepancy between human rights law and the reality of state practice. He
notes the newspapers are full of stories about governments killing, torturing and
imprisoning their citizens. But the same newspapers are also full of local and
48. Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 632.
49. Reply, supra note 21, at 350.
50. Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 610.
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national stories about murders, vicious attacks, and robberies-though we sup-
posedly have an effective system of law and order on a domestic plane.5
Violations of the law are much more notorious and much more likely to be
reported than instances of compliance. They make better copy.52 The attention
they get neither proves nor disproves that non-compliance is more prevalent than
compliance. One is more likely to read about a bank robbery than about a bank
that has not been robbed.
There is a motive for compliance with international human rights law which
Watson has overlooked. It may, to some extent serve a function similar to that
served by reciprocal interests in other branches of international law. Violations of
many of these rules are international crimes or "crimes against humanity. '53
There is the possibility (regrettably not a certainty) that those who violate such
norms when they are in positions of authority will ultimately face criminal
charges before an international tribunal, courts of their own States, or even courts
of other States. 54
Klaus Barbie is being tried for "crimes against humanity." Macias Nguena
5
and the Argentine Junta 56 have been tried on charges involving violations of both
51. Reply, supra note 21, at 350.
52. Charterists and Skeptics, supra note 21, at 363. Freedom House publishes a periodic survey
Gastel, Freedom in the World. This document usually lists the States with the best record of human
rights observance although the survey has been criticized as limited to civil and political rights
observance while ignoring economic, social and cultural rights, Charterists and Skeptics, supra note
21, at 364. Watson is accused of suppressing evidence when dealing with the current status of human
rights.
[H]e does not mention the European Convention on Human Rights or the case law being
developed under that convention by the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Human Rights Court. Nor does he mention the impact that other Western European
countries have had on the progress towards greater political and civil rights in Spain and
Portugal. Nowhere does he discuss the successes, however limited, of bilateral government
actions. Nor does he devote any space to the successful work of private organizations in the
human rights field.
Id. at 366-67.
But Watson is dealing with the practice of States in which all this good news would be irrelevant. One
cannot quarrel with the gloomy facts. But it is submitted that Watson's view of the effect of State
practice on the law is not wholly accurate.
53. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
August 8, 1945, Charter of the Int'l Mil. Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546, E.A.S. No.472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
54. In Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F 2d at 890, Judge Kaufman said; "the torturer has become -
like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
55. Jimdnez, Fernando Volio, Study of the Human Rights Situation in Equatorial Guinea, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1371 (1980).
56. Decision of the National Appeals Court (Criminal Division) for the Federal District of Buenos
Aires, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 331, 359, 359n (1987). The Due Obedience Bill, which passed the
Argentine Senate on May 29, 1987, will exempt all but the most senior officers from further
prosecution and thus undo much that the trials have done to vindicate human rights law. This may
provide grist for the mills of the skeptics. In Argentina it is certainly a political, as well as a legal
question. But, as it is a political and legal matter, international human rights law must be an important
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domestic and international law. Bokassa has been tried and sentenced to death. 57
If Idi Amin were to return to Uganda, no doubt he would be tried on the same
sorts of charges.
There are other encouraging signs. Duvalier" and Marcos have fled. With the
new policy of glasnost in the Soviet Union, the doors of political prisons are
beginning to swing open however reluctantly.
True we have a long way to go. There ought to be some sort of international
criminal tribunal. Torturers, mass murderers and other international criminals
ought to be hostis humani generis59 and, like pirates, triable in the courts of
States wherever they are found. But that is not the same as saying that there is no
international human rights law.
Rules of international law may take years before they'are vindicated. For that
reason, they were of little use to the person at the end of the hammer's arc at
Makindye prison, or being battered to death by a shovel in Kampuchea, or
bastinadoed in Chile. But Watson's denial of international human rights law
would not have been of any use to such people either.
For those who are not in peril of immediate destruction, such as political
prisoners, international human rights law represents a hope. Denial of interna-
tional human rights law can only inflict a damaging blow to that hope.
Example 2-Soft Law
The second example of normative surrender involves international agreements
in which the language is deliberately ambiguous or which leave a wide measure
of discretion to the contracting parties. The question is whether such agreements
envisage an intent to enter into legal relations. The clearest example of normative
surrender of this type is to be found in an article published in 1953 by J.E.S.
Fawcett. 60
part of the debate. Cesar A. Chelola has argued, in an article in the New York Times, June 3, 1987, p.
A27, that this Bill is unconstitutional under Argentine law and is a violation of the United Nations
Convention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,
G.A. Res. 39/64, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/46 (1984); The political question involves President Alfon-
sin's control over the Argentine military. While cynicism is justified, a denial of international human
rights law contributes nothing to the discussion.
57. N. Y. Times, June 13, 1987, at 5. There were observers there from both Amnesty International
and the International League for the Rights of Man, N. Y. Times, December 21, 1986, at 9.
58. Although recent events in Haiti indicate that it is still far from being a model democracy.
59. A proposed amendment to Section 6 of the Canadian Criminal Code will provide Canadian
courts with jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity that were committed
outside Canada. Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, News Release June 23, 1987.
60. Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements, 30 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 381 (1953)
[hereinafter Legal Character]. This author notes, with admiration, the contribution of Sir James
Fawcett, as he is now, to the development of European Human Rights Law as President of the
European Commission on Human Rights. The article cited here is, nonetheless, an example of the
approach to international law which is being criticized in the present article.
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Fawcett had before him a copy of Draft Articles and attached notes which were
a part of the Report on the Law of Treaties6 by Professor Lauterpacht as Special
Rapporteur to the International Law Commission. Article 1 of that Draft defined
"treaties":
Treaties are agreements between States, including organizations of States, intended
to create legal rights and obligations of the parties.
This provision was subsequently developed by the International Law Commis-
sion into Article 2(l)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:6 2
For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) "treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation;
The earlier Draft and Article 2(l)(a) provide only limited assistance to the task
of determining whether a particular instrument is a treaty. The problem is cir-
cular. Attempts to demonstrate that such an instrument is a treaty are usually
motivated by a desire to prove that it creates legal obligations. But one must first
show that it is governed by international law before one can establish that it is a
treaty. The words "governed by international law" are an independent criterion.
Commenting on Article 2(l)(a), the I.L.C. said:
it ought to confine the notion of an "international agreement" for the purposes of
the law of treaties to one the whole formation and execution of which (as well as the
obligation to execute) is governed by international law.63 [emphasis in original].
The commission felt that the element of intention is inherent in the phrase
"governed by international law" and therefore it was not necessary to refer to the
intention of the parties in the definition. 64
Also discussing the nature of treaties Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga said, "the
intention of the parties, express or implied, would appear to be controlling. 65
The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case involved the question whether a
certain communique issued by the parties was a treaty. In its judgment, the
International Court of Justice stated:
[i]n determining what was indeed the nature of the act or transaction embodied in
the Brussels Communiqu6, the Court must have regard above all to its actual terms
and to the particular circumstances in which it was drawn up.66
61. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953).
62. U.N. Doc. A/CONF/39/27 (1969), entered into force January 27, 1980; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969),
reprinted in, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 876 (1969).
63. Documents of the 14th Session including the Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.N. 4/SER. A/1962/ Add. 1.
64. Id.
65. See Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 3,
37 (1978).
66. The Aegean Continental Shelf Case, 119781 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 39.
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In 1953 the intent to enter into a treaty was an essential element in its creation. It
still is.
There are nonbinding agreements. States are free to enter into them whatever
their subject matter. One conspicuous example is the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted at Helsinki on August 1, 1975,
commonly called the Helsinki Agreement. 67 In it, the "High Representatives" of
the thirty-five States which signed the text declared in the concluding paragraph
"their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the
above texts." '68 However, delegates during the conference expressed an under-
standing that the Final Act did not involve a "legal" commitment and was not
intended to be binding upon the signatory powers. 69
Professor Oscar Schachter has described such agreements as leading a "twi-
light existence. "70 He argued that it is not strictly correct to call them "nonbind-
ing." The expectation is that they create obligations even if they are not, strictly
speaking, "legal" obligations. 7' The Helsinki Agreement carries with it a strong
expectation that it will be observed. Perhaps the obligation is a "moral" rather
than a "legal" obligation. But note that it is nonbinding because there is clear
evidence that the parties intended that it not be binding.
Governments are, however, reluctant "to state explicitly in an agreement that it
is nonbinding or lacks legal force." ' 72 With respect to most agreements, in-
ferences have to be drawn as to the intent of the parties from the language of the
instrument and from the attendant circumstances of its conclusion and adoption.
Fawcett's work was aimed at examining this intent and trying to develop rules for
determining whether an agreement is, in fact, a treaty.
Fawcett argued that intent cannot be presumed but must be clearly man-
ifested .7 He then suggested a number of tests:
First, have the parties included in the agreement provision for the settlement by
compulsory judicial process of disputes arising out of it? Secondly, have they both
accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36 of its
Statute in terms which would give the Court jurisdiction over any such dispute?
Third, has the agreement been registered under Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations or Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations? Fourth, is
there an intention declared, or to be deduced from the subject-matter of the agree-
ment, that the agreement or particular provisions of it are to be governed by public
67. 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
68. Id. at 1325.
69. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 247-48
(1976).
70. Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
296 (1977).
71. Id. at 300.
72. Id. at 297.
73. Legal Character, supra note 60, at 385.
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international law, or by a specified system of municipal law, or by the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations?74
The first test he says "appears to be decisive" provided that the process of
settlement is fully judicial and compulsory.75
He describes the second test as a complicated extension of the first and it is
subject to the proviso that the agreement itself does not exclude settlement by the
I.C.J. and that the States in question have no reservation to their acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court which would obviously exclude such a
case.7 6 It is submitted that the second test is, in fact, no test of intent to enter into
legal relations. It is entirely dependant on conditions extraneous to the agree-
ment. Even if the agreement did not bar settlement by the I.C.J. and there were
no reservations obviously excluding the agreement from consideration, the Court
could still find, on the basis of the language and attendant circumstances, that it
was powerless to enforce such an agreement since there was no intent to enter
into legal relations.
Perhaps most surprising, is Fawcett's assertion that the third test, that of
registration, is inconclusive.77 Article 102 of the U.N. Charter provides:
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of
the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been
registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may
invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
The real object of registration, according to Fawcett is to prevent, as far as
possible, the conclusion of secret agreements. The expression "treaty or other
international agreement" is wide enough to include agreements which do not
create legal relations.78 Neither Article 102 nor the regulations made under it
define "treaty" or "international agreement" and they do not require that such
instruments shall be intended to create legal relations. 79 For this reason he felt
that the reference to "treaties and other international instruments" does not neces-
sarily refer to instruments creating binding legal obligations.
The second reason why he does not feel that the test is decisive is that agree-
ments which have not been duly registered are not declared void but rather of
limited applicability before organs of the United Nations. Parties registering their
agreements under Article 102 may be intending to rely on them, not before the
74. Id. at 387-88.
75. id. at 388.
76. Id. at 388-89.
77. Id. at 389.
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 389.
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I.C.J. but before other organs of the U.N. "which do not necessarily consider
agreements in the light of the law." 0
The question is how does one "invoke" an instrument? Certainly Article 102
does not bar a State representative from mentioning any instrument he or she may
wish to mention in a speech before the General Assembly, Security Council, or
any other political organ of the U.N. Invoking an instrument may involve in some
way the process of placing the instrument before an organ for formal considera-
tion. But there is no established procedure for that. It seems that Article 102,
even if it does not say so specifically, is concerned with the invocation of treaties
and other international agreements before the International Court of Justice.
The reference in Article 102 to "treaties and other international agreements"
must be understood according to its ordinary meaning. Article 2(l)(a) of the
Vienna Convention indicates quite clearly that the commonly understood mean-
ing of the word "treaty" is a contractual arrangement between States that creates
binding legal obligations. Article 31(4) says:
A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended. 8'
Thus, the burden of proof would rest with any party attempting to establish that
the term "treaty" has a special meaning in a specific instance, and that an
instrument called a "treaty" does not, in fact, create legal obligations. The
reference in Article 102 to "treaties" must be a reference to binding legal obliga-
tions. Registration under Article 102 is therefore conclusive evidence that the
parties intended to enter into legal relations. For the same reason, the act of
designating an instrument a "treaty" or a "convention" or a "covenant" is also
powerful evidence that the parties intended to enter into legal relations.
Fawcett had a reason for rejecting the third test. He clearly wanted to focus
attention on the fourth test which he regarded as decisive. The thrust of his
argument was that, unless there is some clear agreement to submit the treaty to
judicial settlement, the intention to enter into legal relations must be specifically
declared or it must be deduced from the subject-matter of the agreement.
He then observed that certain provisions in international agreements appear to
negate any intention to create legal relations. "These are provisions which in one
way or another leave it to the parties themselves to determine the extent of the
obligations they have assumed and the mode of performance. ",8 2
His first example was an undertaking qualified by the words "subject to the law
in force." This, he said, would create no legal obligation at all because it would
enable a party to successfully appeal to municipal law against any attempt by
another party to enforce the obligation.13
80. Id. at 390.
81. 8 I.L.M. at 692.
82. Legal Character, supra note 60, at 390.
83. Id. at 390-91.
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Another example he gives is an undertaking "to use best endeavours" or "to
take all possible measures." This represents, in Fawcett's view, no more than a
declaration of policy or "goodwill toward the objects of the agreement. 8 4
Fawcett uses Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 14, 1949 as an
example of a provision which gives the parties complete freedom of action as to
the mode of implementation. It says:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area. . . .[Emphasis added].
The point of using the words "as it deems necessary" rather than "as is
necessary," said Fawcett, "was to give each party freedom of action, that is to
say, freedom from strict legal [Fawcett's emphasis] responsibility, in a situation
which could not be wholly foreseen; and the practical reason is not far to seek
when the constitutional limits upon the war-making powers of certain Govern-
ment members of N.A.T.O. are taken into account." 85
Yet the North Atlantic Treaty is quite clearly a legal obligation. It is called a
treaty and regarded as a treaty by the Parties and it has been registered with the
United Nations.8 6 But because Article 5 gives the States Parties considerable
discretion as to the mode of implementation, Fawcett is prepared to yield up its
normative content.
Fawcett has lumped together a number of treaty provisions which appear to
share the common feature that they allow States considerable discretion as to the
mode of performance or even the extent of the obligations assumed. He denies
the normative content of such provisions.
In a more recent analysis, Professor Prosper Weil, borrowing from Judge
Richard Baxter, 7 calls these provisions "soft law." He describes them as "norms
whose substance is so vague, so uncompelling, that A's obligation and B's right
84. Id. at 391.
85. Id. at 392. A similar point is made by Glennon, United States Mutual Security Treaties: The
Commitment Myths 24 COL. J. TRANSN'L L. 509, 546-47 (1986) [hereinafter Mutual Security
Treaties] where he calls U.S. security treaty commitments "illusory." The thrust of the article is that
U.S. security treaties do not alter the constitutional relationship between the President and Congress
and do not serve as a source of authority permitting the President to introduce U.S. armed forces into
hostilities, id. at 544. In this he is quite correct. But much of the legislative history he cites indicates
quite clearly that the commitments, despite their limitations, were accepted as "legal" commitments
by the U.S. Government. See, e.g, id. at 528-29.
86. The Treaty Series number is 161 U.N.T.S. 253.
87. Baxter, International Law in 'Her Infinite Variety', 29 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 549 (1980).
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all but elude the mind. '"" To further confuse matters, Weil accepts, under the
term "soft law," the "sublegal value of some non-normative acts" such as the
Helsinki Agreement.89 Aside from this, and in contrast to Fawcett, he acknowl-
edges their normative content:
Whether a rule is "hard" or "soft" does not, of course, affect its normative char-
acter. A rule of treaty or customary law may be vague, "soft"; but,. . it does not
thereby cease to be a legal norm. 90
In further discussing the normativity of such provisions, he says:
The acts accomplished by subjects of international law are so diverse in character
that it is no simple matter for a jurist to determine what may be called the nor-
mativity threshold: i.e., the line of transition between the nonlegal and the legal,
between what does not constitute a norm and what does.9
Thus both Weil and Fawcett struggle in different ways with a confusion over
what constitutes normativity. If we look at the actual language of the provisions,
the distinction between "hard law" and "soft law" is not much more helpful than
an outright denial of normativity. What is important is whether it is possible to
identify an obligation and a violation of that obligation.
When we reexamine Fawcett's examples in this light, we can see that each
example can be analyzed differently. The similarities on which Fawcett and Weil
rely obscure real differences. We will focus on Fawcett's examples although there
are many other examples of discretionary language. 92
The words "subject to the law in force" can be read as qualifying only the
mode of performance, the method that a State may choose to render compliance.
Allowing a State to determine in accordance with its own law how best to fulfill
an obligation cannot be construed as releasing it from the obligation. A State may
not appeal to its own law as a defence to a charge of non-fulfillment of an
obligation. 93 But it is quite common for a State to insist on treaty language which
ensures that its fundamental constitutional provisions are not offended. In fact,
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention places the Parties on notice as to constitu-
88. Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (1983)
[hereinafter Relative Normativty]. See also Boetha, Legal and Non-Legal Norms: A Meaningful
Distinction in International Relations?, 9 NETH. Y.B.INT'L L. 63 (1980) who points out, at 68, that
the true distinction is not between normativity and non-normativity but between legal and non-legal
norms.
89. Relative Normativity, supra note 88, at n. 7.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 415.
92. Id. at 414. Weil mentions Article IV of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty which gives each Party a
right to withdraw at its discretion. He also talks about obligations to "consult together," to "open
negotiations," to settle certain problems by "subsequent agreement," and what he calls the purely
hortatory and exhibitory provisions to "seek to," to "make efforts to," to "avoid," etc.
93. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 27, 8 I.L.M. at 690.
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tional rules "of fundamental importance" which deal with the competence of a
State to enter into a treaty.9
4
Obligations "to take all possible measures" and "to use best endeavors" create
what we shall call the "best efforts" standard of performance. Such obligations
are applied and enforced in municipal contract law. 95 When the obligation is to
"take all possible measures," it is possible to identify a violation by arguing that
measures that could have been taken were not taken or that the burden of proof
has shifted to the defendant to show that no measures could have been taken. An
obligation "to use best endeavors" is susceptible to the criticism that the defen-
dant's approach was demonstrably tepid or that the defendant did not really try at
all. 96
The words of the North Atlantic Treaty, "as it deems necessary" present a
different problem. Arguably, a Party might deem no action necessary and still be
in compliance with the Treaty. Yet, a Party which does not act in the face of a
genuine common danger will no doubt be censured or even excluded from the
benefits of the Treaty. A recent example of this may be found in the United States'
reaction to New Zealand's policy of banning nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered
warships from its ports and harbors.
New Zealand is a Party to the ANZUS Agreement, a Treaty which resembles
the NATO Agreement. 97 Yet the weak language of this Treaty and the vast
94. Id. 8 I.L.M. at 697.
95. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 601 F 2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). In Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 215 (1917) Judge Cardozo found that an obligation to
pay royalties involved an implied promise to "use reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into
existence." § 2-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code imports a "best efforts" clause into many
contracts:
A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods
concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to
supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.
The best efforts standard is an essential normative standard in U.S. common law. In French law,
article 1174 of the Code Civil provides:
The obligation is null when it is contracted under a potestative condition. . . .But nothing
prevents the insertion in a contract of a condition simply potestative, that is to say, consisting
in the happening of a future fact which depends upon the will of one of the parties.
The judges of fact have to determine the potestative character of the condition. Planiol, TRAIT8
ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, vol. 2, Part I (An English Translation by the Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1959) No. 1269A, p. 721.
96. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 601 F.2d at 614.
97. Article Ill of the ANZUS Treaty says:
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.
Article IV says:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be
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measure of discretion that appears to be left to the Parties has not prevented the
United States from accusing New Zealand of violating its ANZUS obligations
and, as punishment, cutting off the flow of certain intelligence information and
treating New Zealand as if it were no longer a Party to the Treaty.
States do not treat such discretionary obligations as devoid of normative con-
tent. In fact, when they are trying to hold another party to an obligation, they
insist that it is possible to identify a violation. It is doubtful that New Zealand has
violated the ANZUS Treaty. But if there were an armed attack in either the Pacific
or the North Atlantic, a decision by a Party to join with or aid the attacker would
clearly be a violation of an alliance agreement with the attacked Party.9"
The second example of normative surrender involves yielding up the normative
content of binding treaty obligations because they give the parties a broad discre-
tion as to the mode of implementation. But we can see that in each example given
it is possible to identify an obligation and a breach of that obligation.
Example 3-Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
For the third example of normative surrender we can come back to Watson.
Here we are not dealing with a matter which is central to his thesis. He simply
repeats a half-truth about the Court which has been frequently asserted in recent
years and follows it with a normative concession of some magnitude:
The International Court of Justice, consistent with the traditional theory of interna-
tional law, bases its jurisdiction firmly on state consent. This acknowledgment of
the importance of state consent has the effect of substantially increasing the com-
pliance rate of the Court's judgments since, in deciding whether to appear before
the Court, a State can assess its own willingness to comply with an adverse
decision. A State that is not willing to comply with such a decision will simply not
appear before the Court."
There are two assumptions in this passage that require analysis. The first is the
express statement that the jurisdiction of the Court is founded on the consent of
States. The second, implicit in this passage involves the notion that States have
no duty to appear before the International Court of Justice. The first assumption
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
This contrasts with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty in three ways. It does not contain:
(i) the acknowledgment that an armed attack upon one is an attack upon all; (ii) the specific
obligation to take immediate action to assist the party or parties attacked; (iii) the reference to
the restoration and maintenance of the security of the treaty area.
J.G. Stark, THE ANZUS ALLIANCE, 116 (1965).
98. See Mutual Security Treaties, supra note 85, at 546-47.
99. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 278. A slightly more accurate reference to I.C.J.
jurisdiction may be found in Normativity and Reality, supra note 29, at 225.
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is true. But, as it has been formulated by Watson and others, it is misleading. The
second is controversial and, in the present author's view, incorrect.
It is a truism that the consent of States forms the basis of the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. In a joint dissenting opinion in the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company Case, Judges Winiarski and Badawi said:
En droit international, c'est le consentement des parties qui conf~re juridiction A la
Cour; ]a Cour n'a competence que dans la mesure ou sa juridiction a dtd accept6e
par les parties.°0
Stated in this unqualified form, the principle has been used to justify the non-
appearance of States before the International Court of Justice.' 0 The impression
created is that consent must be obtained from the respondent State in each
specific case. But this is a false impression.
There are three types of consent. We may call them "consent to Statute,"
"consent to case," and "consent to Court".
Confusion arises from a failure of analysis which is typical of normative
surrender. Consent to Statute occurs when a State becomes a Party to the Statute
of the Court. Article 93 of the United Nations Charter sets out the ways in which
a State can become a Party to the Statute. A State automatically becomes a Party
by becoming a member of the United Nations. If it is not a member of the U.N.,
it may become a Party to the Statute under Article 93(2). Article 35(1) of the
Statute says that the "Court shall be open to states parties to the present Statute."
A State should be well aware that by becoming a member of the United
Nations, it becomes a party to the Statute of the Court. It accepts the benefit that
the Court is open to it should it choose to avail itself of that benefit. It accepts the
duties imposed upon Parties by the Statute and it consents to the Court exercising
certain inherent judicial functions.10 2
Consent to case occurs when States conclude a special agreement under Arti-
cle 36(1) of the Statute to bring a specific case to the International Court of
Justice. The element of consent is unequivocally present and jurisdiction is not
usually contested. 03
100. [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89, 97.
In international law it is the consent of the parties which confers jurisdiction on the Court; the
Court has jurisdiction only in so far as that jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties.
101. See e.g., Nuclear Test Cases, 1974 I.C.J. Pleadings 348, (Letter of 16 May 1973).
102. This is discussed in some detail in Elkind, INTERIM PROTECTION: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH,
162-63, 177 (1981).
103. Although, a State may claim that a certain document is not, in fact, a special agreement,
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case [1978] I.C.I. Rep. 3, 44. This case was, however, commenced by
unilateral application.
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Consent to Court occurs when a State accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court either through a provision in a treaty or convention in force' °4 or
through acceptance of the compulsory clause in Article 36(2) of the Statute.
In the case of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, we can see that the
element of consent is definitely present. But it is general consent either to a
certain type of case described in the treaty or to international law cases generally
under Article 36(2). Such cases are commonly commenced through unilateral
application by a "state accepting the same obligation."
Consent to Court through the vehicle of compulsory jurisdiction differs signifi-
cantly from consent to case. Acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction may be and
frequently is qualified by reservations on the part of the accepting State. But even
with such reservations, it is difficult for the accepting State to forecast the type of
case that will ultimately be brought against it. The problem arises when a State
which has generally accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is unhappy
with the specific case which has been filed against it. Its first course is to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court which it has every right to do. But the
principle of consent, raised by some international lawyers almost to an incanta-
tion, 05 provides a spurious justification for reneging on the earlier obligation.
Too often, a State may seek to bolster its objection to jurisdiction by refusing to
appear in a case on the ostensible ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction.l°0
Consent to Statute however imposes upon Parties a duty to allow the Court to
decide whether it has jurisdiction. Article 36(6) of the Statute provides:
104. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(l).
105. Id.
A typical example of this deficiency of analysis may be found in HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER AND
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 615 (2d ed. 1987). Referring to an un-
acknowledged work, it says:
It has been suggested that when the Court has jurisdiction ratione personae under Article 35
[of the Statute of the Court], it may order interim measures against any state party to the
Statute. However, no judge has accepted this view, which runs counter to the premise of
consent to the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36.
The argument which has been either dismissed or ignored so many times is that the jurisdiction of
the Court to order interim measures is based on consent to Statute under Article 35. That point still
awaits refutation in logic or principal if such refutation is possible. The judges, by failing to accept
this logical approach to interim measures jurisdiction are acquiescing in the perpertuation of the very
rod with which their authority has been flogged throughout the history of the Court.
See also Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 865-66 (1987) which mainfests the same defect in analysis in
discussing jurisdiction to order interim measures. For some reason this article ignores the literature on
the subject.
106. In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the
United States took the step of actually withdrawing from the case after a decision by the Court that it
did, in fact, possess jurisdiction, [19841 I.C.J. Rep. 169.
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In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.'07
Some scholars have attempted to provide elaborate justifications for non-ap-
pearance. One norm which is yielded up in the process is the duty to appear
before the Court. The notion that there is no duty to appear was first mooted by
Shabbatai Rosenne'08 and developed by the First Secretary of the International
Court of Justice, Hugh Thirlway, in his study of non-appearance before the
I.C.J. 109
The argument is grounded in the fact that non-appearance is recognized by the
Statute of the Court. Article 53 provides:
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend
its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favor of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in
accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well-founded in fact
and law.
The argument strays into Austinian territory by pointing out that the authors of
the Statute did not intend to penalize a State which does not appear. The guts of
the argument seems to be that, since the Statute expressly contemplates and
provides for non-appearance, the Parties therefore have no duty to appear."0
Rosenne says that the Parties have a right not to appear."' Thirlway relies on
Hohfeldian analysis to argue that the absence of a duty is the equivalent, not of a
right, but of a privilege. The absent State does not rely on a right not to appear,
"but since neither its opponent nor the Court has a right to insist that it do appear,
it is under no duty to appear, or may assert a 'privilege' not to appear.""' 2
The drafting history of Article 53 does not bear out this interpretation. An
Advisory Committee of Jurists was charged with the task of drafting the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Some of the draft schemes
originally submitted to it contained proposals dealing with the non-appearance of
one of the parties. However the question of non-appearance was considered
premature because the Committee had not yet considered the question of the
107. For a more detailed discussion see Elkind, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 117-68 (1984).
108. Rosenne, The Reconceptualization of Objections in the International Court of Justice, 11
processo internazionale, Studi in onore di Gaetano Morelli XIV COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 735,
749-50 (1975).
109. Thirlway, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 64-82 (1985)
[hereinafter Thirlway]. See also Eisemann, Les effets de la non-comparution devant la Cour interna-
tional de justice, 9 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 351, 357-58 (1980).
110. Thirlway, supra note 109, at 65, quoting the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros in the Nuclear
Test Cases (Interim Measures) (Australia v. France) [1973] I.C.J. Rep. 99, 116.
Ill. Rosenne, supra note 108.
112. Thirlway, supra note 109, at 81.
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Court's jurisdiction. 1 13 The issue depended, at least in part, on whether the
Statute was to provide for compulsory jurisdiction.
Article 34 of the Draft Statute submitted by the Advisory Committee to the
Council of the League of Nations did provide for compulsory jurisdiction. It said:
Between States which are members of the League of Nations the Court shall have
the jurisdiction [and this without any special conventions giving it jurisdiction] to
hear and determine cases of a legal nature ... 114
It was not until this provision reached the League of Nations Council that com-
pulsory jurisdiction was dropped on the ground that it exceeded the authority
granted by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." 5
At the 28th Meeting of the Committee a memorandum on non-appearance was
tendered by M. Hagerup."16 In it, he contrasted the Continental procedure of the
time with the English procedure. In the former, plaintiff's allegations of fact were
taken as admitted. In the latter, plaintiff was required to prove his case insofar as
the burden of proof lay with him. M. Hagerup preferred the Continental pro-
cedure because the English system placed the plaintiff under the disadvantage of
having to prove facts which the defendant would not have disputed had he
presented himself before the Court. But the Advisory Committee as a whole
preferred the English system."7
M. Ricci-Busatti of Italy opposed the Article. He did not see it as giving the
defending party a right or privilege not to appear. Rather, he objected that, if the
powers of the Court were to be exactly the same in cases of judgments by default
as they were to be when both parties appeared, the provision would be quite
useless. To his way of thinking, the inclusion of a special provision would be
justified only if it were to operate in the interests of the plaintiff and to punish the
other party for its dereliction in failing to come to the Court. Since such a
provision was not practicable in international affairs, he proposed suppression of
the Article." 8 Mr. Root of the United States countered that judgments by default
were necessary and that such judgments should contain a full statement of the
reasons. 119
Thus, Article 53 was part of an original scheme containing draft Article 34 by
which jurisdiction was to be compulsory. So the Committee did not foresee that
113. PROCES VERBAUX OF THE COMMrrTEE OF JURISTS TO DRAFT THE STATUTE FOR A PERMA-
NENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 247 (1920) [hereinafter PROCES VERBAUX].
114. J.B. SCOTT, THE PROJECT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND
RESOLUTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 95 (1920).
115. Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the League of Nations under
Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Court of Justice 38 (1921).
116. PROCES VERBAUX, supra note 113, at 607, 28th Mtg, Annex No. 2.
117. Id. at 569.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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the parties would have an opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or
a half-way plausible excuse not to appear. Given the original scheme it does not
seem credible that the Committee intended to confer upon the parties a right or a
privilege not to appear. On the contrary, it appears that some of the members
wanted to punish states for failure to appear. This was abandoned because the
Committee felt that such punishment would not be practicable in international
affairs.
The purpose of Article 53 is to provide for the eventuality of non-appearance.
To contend that it thereby permits non-appearance is rather like arguing that if
one buys a policy of fire insurance, that person creates in some other person a
right to burn down his or her house. 12 0
The duty to appear is found in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court and, to
some extent in Article 94 of the United Nations Charter. When we talk about
jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of the Statute, whether through special agreement
or through "treaties and conventions in force," the duty to appear is a natural by-
product of the rule pacta sunt servanda combined with the undertaking in those
instruments to submit certain disputes for decision by the Court.
Article 36(2) says that the States party to the Statute may declare unilaterally
that they recognize the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory. The Court has
held in the Nuclear Test Cases (Second Phase) that a unilateral declaration by a
State can create legal obligations.'2' It involves a remarkable use of language to
contend that a legal duty freely undertaken to recognize the Court's jurisdiction
as compulsory involves no legal duty. There is a legal duty to act consistently
with that recognition, to accept the process of the Court and to allow the Court to
decide questions of disputed jurisdiction.
Once the Court has decided that it has jurisdiction, then Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter creates a duty to comply with the decision. Thus, a decision on jurisdic-
tion strengthens the obligation to appear in the merits phase unless we can
somehow convince ourselves that a refusal to appear is compliance with the
decision of the Court. A State which does not appear cannot be compelled to do
so. But both the opposing Party and the Court have a right to insist that the
respondent State appear.
There is no doubt that the compulsory clause has fallen on hard times. France,
and most recently the United States, have withdrawn their acceptance of the
clause. Today, a small minority of members of the United Nations accept the
clause. 2
Submitting international disputes for third party settlement seems to have
120. This example is, of course subject to the obvious riposte that arson is illegal in any event and
that I cannot give someone a right or a privilege to commit arson. But even if arson were not illegal,
providing for an eventuality does not, without more, create a right or a privilege.
121. New Zealand v. France 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, 472.
122. Scott & Car, The 1.C.J. and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81
AM. J.INT'L L. 57, 58 (1987).
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become rather unpopular. So it is not surprising that timid international lawyers,
should suggest scrapping Article 36(2)123 on the ground that "[m]ost States prefer
not to accept a condition that might place them before the Court involuntarily. "1 24
This is not normative surrender in the strict sense. It does not involve the same
sort of normative sloppiness which has been criticized in this article. Yet it is
born of the same spirit. There seems to be a fear that States will be embarrassed
by the temptation to virtue that compulsory jurisdiction represents and a concern
to spare them that embarrassment. The proposal must be viewed as a "law
reform" proposal, a sort of progressive enfeeblement of international law.
CONCLUSION-THE MOTIVE FOR COMPLIANCE
The term "normative surrender" describes an approach to law which denies
the normative legal content of certain rules which can be authenticated according
to one of the three law-creating processes set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Normative surrender has three characteristics; (1)
the Austinian fallacy that a norm which cannot be enforced is not a legal norm;
(2) an overemphasis on the consent of States; and (3) the fallacy that a norm
which leaves States with a wide margin of appreciation as to the mode of enforce-
ment is not a legal norm.
Lawyers and laypeople alike seem to be transfixed by the notion that a norm, to
be law, must be enforceable. If a norm cannot be enforced, they want to say that
it is not a legal norm'25 and the principle that international law is based on consent
provides a spurious escape from this conceptual problem.
Most international lawyers would reject the full logical extension of this princi-
123. Id. at 57.
124. Id. at 58.
125. This moral outlook would seem to be accurately summarized by Lawrence Kohlberg in his
description of Stage I, the most primitive of his "Stages of Moral Development". Kohlberg calls
Stage I "The Punishment and Obedience Stage" in which:
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the
human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning
deference to power are valued in their own right.
L. Kohlberg, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE 17 (1981). By contrast, in Stage 6, "The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation":
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles
appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency. These principles are
abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative) they are not concrete moral
rules such as the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as
individuals.
Id. at 21.
If, as the "realist" international lawyers seem to believe, the majority of statespersons and leaders are
at Stage I, must the academic community follow?
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pie which is that international law can never be violated. But there is a pervasive
notion that if States can violate a rule without sanction or if they have discretion
in determining the mode of compliance with a rule, then perhaps it is not a rule of
law.
The principle of "consent" is valid to the extent that international law is
created by States and to the extent that it provides many mechanisms by which a
State can opt out of a rule to which it does not wish to consent.'26
The principle of consent is most often put to the test when a State seeks to
renege on consent previously given or when it balks at the specific application of
a rule to which it has given general consent.'27 Here we must say that there is a
rule, grounded in consent, and that the rule has been violated. As in contract law,
the withdrawal of consent must be governed by rules. The fact that one doesn't
like one's bargain cannot be a sufficient ground for withdrawing from it. If that
were so, then there would be no rule pacta sunt servanda. We would have to
surrender virtually the whole of contract and treaty law. The doctrines of nor-
mative surrender which we have been discussing provide a striking analogy.
The expectation of reciprocity is probably the most important motive for
compliance with international law. But there is another motive involving the
concept of the "rule of law." We will not here deal with the formulation of the
"rule of law" advanced by A.V. Dicey.25 This involves precepts of English
Constitutional Law which are irrelevant for our purposes. We can abstract two
fundamental propositions from the "rule of law" idea. The first is the notion of
the supremacy or predominance of law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary
power. The second is the duty of all to obey the law.
Every Government, even the most despotic Government has an interest in
being seen by its own population and by the world in general as a repository of
the rule of law. It wants its own citizens to accept a duty to obey the law apart
from the content of the law itself and apart from the coercive power of the
State.'29 A State which violates its legal obligations can justifiably be viewed as
lawless, not only by its own population, but by the rest of the world.
126. With respect to the law of treaties, a State first of all may choose not to become a party to a
treaty. But should it choose to become a party, Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties allow it to condition its acceptance by means of reservations. Articles 39-41 permit a
States to modify treaties and Articles 42-71 set out rules relating to "Invalidity, Termination and
Suspension of the Operation of Treaties". The leading case on dissent from rules of customary
international law is the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) 1951 I.C.J.
Rep. 116.
127. Fitzmaurice, The Problem of the 'Non-appearing' Defendant Government 51 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 89, 99-100 (1980).
128. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsrTTUTION 202-03(10th ed.
1962).
129. This is the crux of the perennial debate on civil disobedience. See F BOYLE, DEFENDING
CIVIL RESISTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987). It is in the interest of every Government, even
those which have come into being through civil disobedience and revolution, to answer the advocates
of civil disobedience by invoking the "rule of law" as a moral duty to obey the law.
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This is not just an appeal to world opinion. It is tied up with the legitimacy of
the State itself. A State which does not acknowledge a duty, on its own part, to
obey the law forfeits much of its moral authority to insist on obedience from its
own citizens. 130 The detriment is that it undermines the authority of its own laws
and sabotages the authority of its judiciary. Of course, it retains the means of
coercion, but that is all it has. The rule of law is transformed into the rule of
force.
It is here that we return to the effect of doctrine on the development of
international law. The justification that is presented in this article has seldom
been articulated and is little understood. As a practical matter, its importance as a
motive for law-compliance depends on whether States recognize and fear the
detriment which has been identified. This, in turn, depends upon two precondi-
tions; a) that violations of international law are clearly identified as such and b)
that the detriment is widely understood. Both of those preconditions are the
responsibility of international law scholars, the creators of the doctrine.
The realist schools of international law serve a very useful function. They help
us to understand the functional limitations of the discipline. But the danger is
that, in order to avoid appearing naive, we may be deterred from fully utilizing
what there is and from testing the outer boundaries of the functional limitations.
The real disservice is normative surrender. Denial of the legal nature of certain
norms of behavior provides too ready a justification for the violation of such
norms. It surrenders unto Caesar what should be rendered unto God and the law.
130. See Pitkin, Obligation and Consent, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 39, 40 (1966); Raz, Authority
and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 117 (1981). A somewhat different view is taken by R. GREEN-
AWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987). He argues that a duty to obey is not necessarily
linked to legitimate authority. The argument herein advanced is that a Government's call for obe-
dience to the law is logically linked to respect for its own legal obligations.
